ONE NATION ONE ELECTION: WEAKENING FEDERALISM AND UNDERMINING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Abstract

The recent legislative push for 'One Nation One Election' (ONOE) in India has reignited a critical debate on its potential to undermine the nation's core constitutional ethos. This paper addresses the research problem of whether synchronizing national and state elections, as proposed by the Constitutional amendment Bills, can be achieved without compromising the principles of flexible federalism and democratic accountability. Employing a constitutional and analytical methodology, the study tests the ONOE scheme against the established threshold of India's federal structure and decentralized democracy. The core argument established is that the ONOE proposal, driven by promises of cost savings and governance efficiency, is an undesired electoral reform. The paper finds that ONOE’s centralizing tendencies pose a significant risk of marginalizing regional voices, overshadowing local issues with national narratives, and ultimately tilting the balance of power toward the Union, thereby threatening state autonomy and federalism. Furthermore, it is argued that the scheme threatens democratic accountability by potentially homogenizing identities and diluting the check on executive power by guaranteeing a fixed term for the government in a parliamentary system. In conclusion, ONOE is fundamentally incompatible with the inclusive, diverse, and cooperative spirit of Indian federalism and representative democracy. The paper suggests that electoral reform should focus instead on regulating excessive campaign expenditure and improving the Model Code of Conduct, rather than implementing a systemic change that endangers the nation's democratic fabric.